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Abstract: Wind energy is currently the most widely implemented renewable 14 
energy source in global scale. Complex industrial multi-MW wind turbines are 15 
continuously being installed both onshore and offshore. Projects involving utility-16 
scale wind turbines require optimisation of reliability, availability, maintainability 17 
and safety, in order to guarantee the financial viability of large scale wind 18 
energy projects, particularly offshore, in the forthcoming years. For this reason, 19 
critical wind turbine components must be identified and monitored as cost-20 
effectively, reliably and efficiently as possible. The condition of industrial wind 21 
turbines can be qualitatively evaluated through the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 22 
The quantitative analysis requires high computational cost. In this paper, the 23 
Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) method is proposed for reducing this 24 
computational cost. In order to optimise the BDD a set of ranking methods of 25 
events has been considered; Level, Top-Down-Left-Right, AND, Depth First 26 
Search and Breadth-First Search. A quantitative analysis approach in order to 27 
find a general solution of a Fault Tree (FT) is presented. An illustrative case 28 
study of a FT of a wind turbine based on different research studies has been 29 
developed. Finally, this FT has been solved dynamically through the BDD 30 
approach in order to highlight the identification of the critical components of the 31 
wind turbine under different conditions, employing the following heuristic 32 
methods: Birnbaum, Criticality, Structural and Fussell-Vesely. The results 33 
provided by this methodology allow the performance of novel maintenance 34 
planning from a quantitative point of view. 35 
 36 
Key words: Fault Tree Analysis, Binary Diagram Decisions, Wind Turbines, 37 
Condition Monitoring, Maintenance Management  38 
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1 Introduction 39 
 40 
The wind energy industry has undergone considerable development over the 41 
past 35 years. This has resulted in wind power becoming the most important 42 
renewable energy source available to humanity so far. Many studies predict that 43 
the growth trends for wind energy will continue at a strong steady pace at least 44 
until 2030 [1]. The size and complexity of industrial Wind Turbines (WTs) will 45 
continue to grow with 10 MW-rated devices already being at the design stage. 46 
The effective implementation of such large wind turbines will require more cost-47 
effective operations based on optimised levels of Reliability, Availability, 48 
Maintainability and Safety (RAMS).  49 
 50 
Blanco [2] showed that the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs can be 51 
20%–30% of the total Level Cost of Electricity (LCOE) over the project’s 52 
lifetime. Although larger turbines may reduce the O&M costs per unit power, 53 
the cost per failure increases due to the combined cost associated with 54 
emergency corrective maintenance and loss of production during downtime [3]. 55 
By employing a suitable Condition Monitoring (CM) technique, many faults can 56 
be detected and controlled under operational conditions. Early detection of 57 
incipient faults prevents major component failures and allows for the 58 
implementation of predictive repair strategies [4]. Therefore, appropriate actions 59 
can be planned in time to prevent major failures which in the case of corrective 60 
maintenance procedures would result in significant O&M costs and downtimes. 61 
CM techniques provide useful information that support operational efficiency 62 
and contribute to the improvement of new turbine designs.  63 
 64 
Some components fail earlier than intended by their design and cause 65 
unscheduled downtimes which reduce the productivity of the wind farm. 66 
Condition Monitoring Systems (CMS) can contribute to the improved operational 67 
control of the critical components [5], [6] and [7]. CM techniques, such as 68 
vibration and oil analysis, acoustic emission, temperature measurement, etc., 69 
together with advanced signal processing methods and data trending, provide 70 
continuous information regarding the status of the component being monitored 71 
[8] and [9]. CM techniques are used to collect the main functional parameters of 72 
critical components, such as the gearbox, generator, main bearings, blades, 73 
tower, etc. [10]. This paper presents a novel approach for determining the 74 
critical components of any WT in different conditions based on a real case 75 
study. The results reported herewith support the optimisation of CM design and 76 
investment. For this purpose a method based on fault tree analysis (FTA) that 77 
allows qualitative analysis is presented. Quantitative Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 78 
is performed by employing Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs). In section 2 are 79 
presented the FTAs, BDDs, the conversion from FTA to BDD and some 80 
experiments to test and verify the approach. In section 3, importance measures 81 
for the Fault Tree (FT) have been presented and tested in order to identify the 82 
events that are more important for the fault of the top event. Finally, in section 4, 83 
a case study of an FT for a WT has been developed considering large research 84 
studies and analysed qualitatively and quantitatively, where the main results are 85 
presented in section 5. The main components of WTs and their relationship 86 
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have been set taking into account the comments of industrial experts involved in 87 
the European Projects NIMO [11] and OPTIMUS [12]. The critical components 88 
have been set according to different scenarios. This study will be a useful 89 
reference for those involved in the optimisation of the design of the CMS and 90 
therefore the investment required.    91 
 92 
2 Reliability analysis 93 
 94 
2.1 Fault tree analysis and binary decision diagrams 95 
 96 
Identification of potential hazardous events, assessment of their consequences 97 
and frequency of occurrence is necessary in order to improve the application of 98 
CMS for WTs. Efficient CMS can effectively contribute to the reduction of O&M 99 
costs, as well as increase the RAMS of WTs. In this paper a FT is proposed as 100 
a graphical representation of the logical relationships between the elements that 101 
comprise WTs. A FT is compound by different events and logic gates (see 102 
Figure 1(a)): 103 
 Top event is an undesirable event. It is unique in the FT. 104 
 Basic events (ei) perform basic fault inputs to the FT that can occur more 105 
than once in a FT. 106 
 Intermediate events (gi) are represented by the combination of elemental 107 
and/or other intermediate events through logic gates. Intermediate 108 
events can be repeated in the FT but their branch must be the same. 109 
 Logic gates (AND/OR) connect events by the coexistence of all input 110 
events (AND), or at least only one of the input events (OR) to reproduce 111 
the output event. 112 
 113 
Complex systems analysis may produce thousands of combinations of events, 114 
or cut-sets (C-Ss), that can result in system failure. The determination of these 115 
C-Ss can be a large and time-consuming process. If the FT has many C-Ss, the 116 
determination of the exact top event probability also requires lengthy 117 
calculations. As a consequence, approximation techniques have been 118 
introduced with a loss of accuracy [13]. Herewith, the BDD is proposed to solve 119 
the probability of the top event of the FT (see Figure 1(a)). 120 
 121 
BDDs, as shown in example in Figure 1(b), are directed acyclic graphs (V, N), 122 
with vertex set V (vertices) and index set N (position of v in the order of 123 
variables) that represent the Boolean functions introduced by Lee in 1959 [14], 124 
and further popularised by Akers[15], Moret [16], and Bryant [17]. BDD provides 125 
a new alternative to traditional C-Ss approaches for FTA that leads to the 126 
determination of the output value of the function through the inputs values.  127 
 128 
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Figure 1. Structure of: a) FTs; b) BDDs 130 
 131 
2.2  Conversion from FTA to BDD 132 
 133 
The size of a BDD depends on several Boolean variables. An adequate ranking 134 
of basic events is crucial in order to reduce the size of the BDD, and therefore 135 
the computational cost. There are different methods, and some of them will be 136 
more adequate than other depending on the problem structure, number of 137 
variables, etc. In this paper, the “Level”, “Top-down-Left-Right”, “AND”, “Depth 138 
First Search” and “Breadth-First Search” methods have been considered for 139 
listing the events, or vertices Ai, and a comparative analysis has been 140 
performed in order to set the best ranking order. 141 
 142 
The number of C-Ss is reduced according to the ranking of the events, with the 143 
probability of the top event being the same in any case. A suitable ranking will 144 
reduce the complexity of the calculation of the top event probability. In order to 145 
set a correct ranking of the events, the methods presented in section 2.3 have 146 
been considered. 147 
 148 
2.3  Rankings for Events 149 
 150 
Different methods for ranking events can be used. The main methods include: 151 
 152 
 The “Top-Down-Left-Right” (TDLR) method generates a ranking of the 153 
events by ordering them from the original FT structure in a top-down and 154 
then left-right manner [18]. The listing of the events is initialized, at each 155 
level, in a left to right path adding the basic events found in the ordering 156 
list. In the case that an event had been considered previously and 157 
located higher up then it is ignored.  158 
 The “Depth First Search” (DFS) approach goes from top to down of a 159 
root and each sub-tree from left to right. This procedure is a non-160 
recursive implementation and all freshly expanded nodes are added as 161 
last-input last-output process [19].  162 
 The “Breadth-First Search” (BFS) algorithm orders all the basic events 163 
obtained, expanding from the standpoint by the first-input first-output 164 
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procedure. The events not considered are added in a queue list named 165 
“open”, where they are being taken into account in the procedure, and 166 
the list is recalled “closed” list when the all the events are studied [20]. 167 
 The “Level” method creates a ranking of the events according to their 168 
level. The level of any event is understood as the number of the gates 169 
that is higher up a tree until the top event. In case that two or more 170 
events have the same level, the event which will have highest priority is 171 
the one appearing earlier in the tree [21].  172 
 The “AND” criterion states that the importance of the basic event is 173 
based on “and” gates located between the k event and the top event as 174 
these gates imply redundancies in the FTA systems [13]. Basic events 175 
with the highest number of “AND” gates will be ranked at the end. In case 176 
of duplicated basic events, the event with less “AND” gates has 177 
preference. Finally, basic events with the same number of “AND” gates 178 
can be ranked using the TDLR method. 179 
 180 
A set of FTs have been considered in order to test the ranking obtained by the 181 
methods aforementioned and are presented in Table 1. Different sizes of trees 182 
and structures (number of “AND” and “OR” gates, and levels) have been 183 
considered.  184 
 185 
The Level, TDLR, AND, DFS and BFS methods have been employed and 186 
analysed together regarding to the C-Ss number obtained by the BDD of the 187 
FTs showed in Table 1. If the size of C-Ss increases, then the computational 188 
time required for calculating the probability of the top event rises. The numbers 189 
of C-Ss of the FTs are shown in Figure 2. BFS generates generally poor results, 190 
especially when the FT has a high number of events, levels and “or” and “and” 191 
gates. Otherwise, the Level and AND methods generate small number of C-Ss. 192 
The conclusions regarding to Level, DFS and TDLR approach should be 193 
studied for each FT. 194 
Table 1. Fault Tree case studies 195 
FAULT TREE Size AND gates  OR gates Levels 
A 4 2 2 2 
B 5 3 3 3 
C 6 3 3 3 
D 8 3 3 2 
E 12 2 10 7 
F 12 3 10 3 
G 19 6 8 3 
H 25 6 16 12 
I 17 8 9 5 
 196 
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 197 
Figure 2. Numbers of C-Ss given by AND, Level, BFS, DFS and TDLR methods 198 
 199 
3  Importance Measures 200 
 201 
A classification and identification of the events that are more important for the 202 
fault of the top event is necessary. The Importance Measures (IMs) can be used 203 
to rank basic events with respect to their contribution to the probability of the top 204 
event. IMs are calculated by the Birnbaum, Criticality, Structural and Fussell-205 
Vesely heuristic methods considering the same probability of fault (0.01) for 206 
each event.  207 
 208 
 Birnbaum introduces a measure of importance of a FTA based on the 209 
probability caused to the fault of the system by each component k [2].  210 
 The Criticality importance measure considers the fault probability of an 211 
event [22].  212 
 A new index based on the theoretical development completed by 213 
Birnbaum is defined by Lambert [22] in order to define the Structural 214 
method.  215 
 The IM of Fussell-Vesely of any event is given by the conditional 216 
probability that at least one minimal C-S that contains component i, 217 
considering that the system is failed [23]. This measurement considers 218 
the highest importance to the largest probability of being the cause of the 219 
system failure [24]. 220 
 221 
The FT example showed in Figure 3 is used to test the different IM methods. 222 
 223 
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Figure 3. FTA Example 225 
It should be noted that the values obtained by IMs are used to rank the events. 226 
Table 2 shows that events    and   , from example, have the highest IM for 227 
Birnbaum, Criticality, Structural and Fussell-Vesely methods. Therefore, they 228 
will be considered as the critical elements where the main maintenance tasks 229 
are recommended based on these events in order to guarantee the reliability of 230 
the system. It can be seen that all the methods for IMs found similar solutions to 231 
rank the events. 232 
 233 
Table 2. IM of heuristic methods for the FTA from an example  234 
Events Birnbaum Criticality Structural Fusell-Vesely 
e1 0.010 0.249 0.094 0.505 
e2 0.010 0.249 0.094 0.254 
e3 0.020 0.500 0.281 1.000 
e4 0.010 0.249 0.094 0.500 
e5 0.010 0.249 0.094 0.249 
e6 0.020 0.500 0.281 1.000 
 235 
 236 
4  FTA for WTs  237 
 238 
The main components of the WTs are illustrated in Figure 4. The blades, 239 
connected to the rotor via the hub, are moved by the wind blowing on them. The 240 
rotor transmits the mechanical energy via the low speed shaft through the 241 
gearbox to the high speed shaft, ending in the generator. The low speed shaft is 242 
supported by the main bearing. The alignment to the direction of the wind is 243 
controlled by a yaw system that turns the housing (or “nacelle”) for that purpose. 244 
The nacelle is mounted at the top of a tower, and the tower is assembled on a 245 
base or foundation. The pitch system in each blade is a mechanism that turns 246 
the blade to control the wind power captured. This can be employed as an 247 
aerodynamic brake as well as for increasing the efficiency of power production. 248 
The WT has also a hydraulic brake to stop the WT. The meteorological unit, or 249 
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weather station, provides the weather data (e.g. wind speed and direction) to 250 
the control system. The data from the meteorological unit provide the required 251 
information for controlling effectively the pitch system, brake, yaw, etc. 252 
 253 
 254 
Figure 4. Components of the WT: 1-Base/Foundations; 2-Tower; 3-Blades; 4-255 
Meteorological unit (vane and anemometry); 5-Nacelle; 6-Pitch system; 7-Hub; 256 
8-Main bearing; 9- Low speed (main) shaft; 10-Gearbox; 11- High speed shaft; 257 
12-Brake system; 13-Generator; 14-Yaw system, 15-Converter, 16-Bedplate. 258 
N.B. Drive train = 9+11. 259 
 260 
A study of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) for WTs in 2010 261 
(RELIAWIND project) collected the causes of failure and failure modes of a 262 
specific WT of 2MW with a diameter of 80 m [25] and [26]. Some causes of 263 
failures (or root causes) are summarised in Table 3. These main causes of the 264 
failures can be due to environmental conditions (e.g. lightning, ice, fire, strong 265 
winds, etc.) or to defects, malfunctions or failures in the components of the WT 266 
(e.g. braking system failure, or be struck by blade, etc.) [27].  267 
 268 
Table 4 shows some of the principal component failure modes of the WTs [25] 269 
and [28].  270 
Table 3. Root causes of the failures of the components of a WT [25]. 271 
Structural Wear Electrical 
Design fault 
External damage 
Installation defect 
Maintenance fault 
Manufacturing defect 
Mechanical overload 
Mechanical overload–collision 
Corrosion 
Excessive brush wear 
Fatigue 
Pipe puncture 
Vibration fatigue 
Overheating 
Insufficient lubrication 
Calibration error 
Connection failure 
Electrical overload 
Electrical short 
Insulation failure 
Lightning strike 
Loss of power input 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 9 10 11 12 13
14
15
16
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Mechanical overload–wind 
Presence of debris 
Conducting debris 
Software design fault 
 272 
 273 
Table 4. Failure modes of the failures of the components of a WT [25] and [28]. 274 
Mechanical Electrical Material 
Rupture 
Uprooting 
Fracture 
Detachment 
Thermal 
Blockage 
Misalignment 
Scuffing 
Electrical insulation 
Electrical failure 
Output inaccuracy 
Software fault 
Intermittent output 
Fatigue 
Structural 
Ultimate 
Buckling 
Deflection 
 275 
The construction of the illustrative FT studied herewith is focused on a three-276 
blade, pitch controlled geared WT. The WT has been divided into four major 277 
groups of elements for a better FTA:  278 
 The foundation and tower;  279 
 The blades system;  280 
 The electrical components (including generator, electrical and 281 
electronic components);  282 
 The power train (including speed shafts, bearings and a gearbox).  283 
 284 
The elements are connected by AND and OR gates, and their fault probability is 285 
unknown. The faults considered in this paper are set by an exhaustive review of 286 
the literature and the support of member experts in the NIMO and OPTIMUS 287 
FP7 European projects [11] and [12].  288 
 289 
Table 5 shows a summary of the failures from the literature taken into account 290 
for this paper. It can be seen that gearboxes, generators, blades and electric 291 
and control systems have been extensively studied in the literature. 292 
Nonetheless, there are not many references which analyse other components 293 
of a WT such as brakes, hydraulic and yaw systems.  294 
 295 
Table 5. Failures of the main elements of a WT 296 
Foundation 
and tower  
Structural fault      [27] [29] [30] [31] [32] 
Yaw system failure  [33] 
Critical rotor  
Blade failure 
Structural failure [34][35][36][37][38][39][40] [41] 
Pitch system failure [42] 
Hydraulic system fault [43] [44] 
Meteorological unit failure [43]  [45] 
Rotor failure 
Rotor hub   [29][33] 
Bearings   [32][33][44] 
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Power train  
Low speed train failure  [33][46] 
Critical gearbox failure  [33][41][46][47][48][49][50] 
High speed 
train failure  
Shaft [29][33][46]  
Critical brake failure [29][51] 
Electrical 
components  
Critical generator failure [29][46][48][52][53][54]     
Power electronics and electric controls failure [44][46][48]  
 297 
The following sections show the FT for the aforementioned main components of 298 
the WT. It is very important to mark that they could be simplified or extended, 299 
but the authors, following the opinion of the experts, have set them in order to 300 
show the most relevant events. 301 
4.1  Foundation and Tower  302 
 303 
The tower supports the nacelle which is located at a suitable height in order to 304 
minimize the influence of turbulence and to maximize the wind energy. The 305 
tower is assembled by relatively thin-wall steel cylindrical elements welded 306 
together along their perimeters in three sections and joined by bolts. This is 307 
done in order to enable the transportation of the large structural elements to the 308 
wind farm where they need to be assembled in-situ [55]. The base section of 309 
the tower is installed on a reinforced concrete foundation comprising a round 310 
base [56].  311 
 312 
Structural defects associated with the tower, foundation, blades and hub, in the 313 
form of fatigue cracks, delamination etc., can initiate and evolve with time [31]. 314 
The main causes for structural failures are fatigue induced crack initiation and 315 
propagation, extreme wind speeds and distribution, extreme turbulences, 316 
maximum flow inclination and terrain complexity [28], and also ice 317 
accumulation, hail, bird strikes, dust particle impacts, or lightning bolt strikes. 318 
Material fatigue [27] (tower-based fatigue damage has been shown to decrease 319 
significantly when using active pitch for the blades [30]), impact of blades on the 320 
tower, faulty welding and failure of the brakes [32] are the main representative 321 
failure modes. 322 
 323 
The literature shows that the major defects found on WT towers are [11]: cracks 324 
in the concrete base, corrosion [29], gaps in the foundation section, loosen 325 
studs joining the foundation and the first section, loosen bolts joining 326 
first/second and second/third sections and welding damages [27].  327 
 328 
On the top of the tower, the yaw system turns the nacelle in an optimum angle 329 
with respect to the wind direction. Powered by electromechanical or hydraulic 330 
mechanisms (in this paper the electromechanical mechanism is considered), 331 
the yaw systems can seize to operate due to the failure of the yaw motor or the 332 
meteorological unit failure [33] resulting in a wrong yaw angle. Structural failures 333 
could appear when the yaw motor is damaged or it does not have power supply 334 
[57], in addition to extreme wind speed or turbulences and some structural 335 
faults. These structural failures can cause the collapse of the tower [27]. Design 336 
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load cases (DLC) must be taken into account for different design situations and 337 
wind or other conditions. The IEC 61400-1 relative to design requirements for 338 
wind turbines shows some DLCs that shall be considered as minimum [62]. For 339 
example, the event e012 (High wind speed/ turbulence) will occur when DLCs 340 
are exceeded. Table 5 presents the basic and intermediate events for the FT of 341 
the foundation and tower illustrated in Figure 5. 342 
 343 
 344 
Table 5. Principal events in the foundation and tower. 345 
Yaw system failure g005 Yaw motor fault e001 
Structural failure g006 Abnormal vibration I e002 
Yaw motor failure g007 Abnormal vibration H e003 
Wrong yaw angle g008 Cracks in concrete base e004 
Severe structural fault (foundation 
and tower) 
g009 Welding damage e005 
No electric power for yaw motor g010 Corrosion e006 
Meteorological unit failure g011 
Loosen studs in joining foundation 
and first section 
e007 
Structural fault (foundation and 
tower) 
g012 
Loosen bolts in joining different 
sections 
e008 
 
Gaps in the foundation section e009 
Vane damage e010 
Anemometer damage e011 
High wind speed/ turbulence e012 
No power supply from generator e013 
No power supply from grid e014 
 346 
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 348 
Figure 5. Fault tree of the foundation and tower 349 
 350 
4.2  Blade System 351 
 352 
The rotor is located inside the nacelle. The blades are attached to the rotor 353 
shaft by the hub and they are mounted on bearings in the rotor hub. The blades 354 
are the components of the WT with the highest percentage of failures and 355 
downtimes [58]. Ciang et al. in 2008 done a review of damage detection 356 
methods, particularly considering the blades [29]. The rotor hub supports heavy 357 
loads that can lead faults such as clearance loosening at the blade root, 358 
imbalance, cracks and surface roughness [33]. Bearings between blades and 359 
hub can be damaged by wear produced by pitting, deformation of outer face 360 
and rolling elements of the bearings [33], spalling and overheating [44]. Cracks 361 
can appear due to the fatigue [44]. Fatigue, wear, faults in lubrication and 362 
corrosion are typically the main failure cause of bearings.  363 
 364 
The blades faults are predominantly related to structural failures, e.g. strength 365 
[34] and fatigue of the fibrous composite materials [35]. Other faults, e.g. 366 
cracks, erosion, delamination and debonding, could appear in the leading and 367 
trailing edges of the blades [36] and [37]. Delamination, debonding or cracks 368 
are found in the shell [37] and [38], and also in the root section of the blades 369 
[39]. The tip deflections (a structural failure of the blade [40]) increase drag near 370 
the end of the blades [41].  371 
 372 
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A common fault of the blades is associated with the failure of the pitch control 373 
system [42]. In pitch-controlled turbines, the pitch system is a mechanism that 374 
turns the blade, or part of the blade, in order to adjust the angle of attack of the 375 
wind. Turbulence of wind is an important cause for pitch system faults [59]. 376 
Pitching motion can be done by hydraulic actuators or electric motors. The 377 
hydraulic system leads stiffness of bearings, a little backlash and a higher 378 
reliability than the electric motors [46]. The hydraulic system can suffer from 379 
possible defects such as leakage, overpressure and corrosion [44].  380 
 381 
The weather station or meteorological unit provides information about some 382 
characteristics of the wind (direction and speed) to the control system of the 383 
WT. The main failures found in the WT weather station are related to the vane 384 
and anemometer [45]. These can result in adjusting the pitch of the blade to a 385 
sub-optimal angle [43]. Table 6 collects the main faults given in blades, and 386 
Figure 6 shows the FT for the blade system. 387 
  388 
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Table 6. Principal events in the blade system. 389 
Severe blade failure g013 High wind speed/turbulence  e015 
Blade failure g014 Blade angle asymmetry e016 
Pitch system failure g015 Abnormal vibration A e017 
Structural failure of blades g016 Hydraulic motor failure e018 
Hydraulic system failure g017 Leakages in hydraulic system e019 
Wrong blade angle g018 Over pressure in hydraulic system e020 
Hydraulic system fault  g019 Corrosion in hydraulic system e021 
Meteorological unit g020 Vane damage e022 
Structural fault of blades g021 Anemometer damage e023 
Leading and trailing edges 
damage 
g022 Abnormal vibration B e024 
Shell damage g023 Root cracks in the structure of blades e025 
Tip damage g024 Cracks in edges of blades e026 
Rotor system failure g025 Erosion in edges of blades e027 
Rotor system fault g026 Delamination in leading edges of blades e028 
Rotor bearings fault g027 Delamination in trailing edges of blades e029 
Rotor hub fault g028 Debonding in edges of blades e030 
Wear in bearings of the rotor g029 Delamination in shell e031 
Imbalance of blade system g030 Crack with structural damage (shell) e032 
  
Crack on the beam-shell joint e033 
Open tip e034 
Lightning strike on tip e035 
Abnormal vibration C e036 
Cracks in bearings of rotor e037 
Corrosion of pins in bearings of rotor e038 
Abrasive wear in bearings of rotor e039 
Pitting in bearings of rotor e040 
Deformation of face & rolling element in 
bearings of rotor 
e041 
Lubrication fault in bearings of rotor e042 
Clearance loosening at root (hub) e043 
Cracks in the hub e044 
Surface roughness in the hub e045 
Mass imbalance in the hub e046 
Fault in pitch adjustment e047 
 390 
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Figure 6. Fault tree of the blades 392 
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4.3  Generator, electrical and electronic components 393 
The generator, electrical and electronic components are installed inside the 394 
nacelle. The high speed shaft drives the rotational torque to the generator, 395 
where the mechanical energy is converted to electrical energy. This conversion 396 
needs a specific input speed, or a power electronic equipment to adapt the 397 
output energy from the generator to the characteristics of the grid. 398 
Faults in generators can be the result of electrical or mechanical causes [54]. 399 
The main electrical faults are due to open-circuits or short-circuit of the winding 400 
in the rotor or stator [46] that could cause overheating [33]. Many research 401 
works have demonstrated that bearings, rotors and stators involve a high failure 402 
rate in WTs [52]. The bearing failures of the generator are usually caused by 403 
wear, fatigue cracks, asymmetry and imbalance [60]. The rotor and stator 404 
failures can be produced by broken bars [53], air-gap eccentricities and 405 
dynamic eccentricities, among other failures [46]. Rotor imbalance and 406 
aerodynamic asymmetry can have their origin in the non-uniform accumulation 407 
of ice and dirt over the blades system [46]. Short-circuit faults, open-circuit 408 
faults and gate drive circuit faults are the three major electrical faults of the 409 
power electronics and electric controls in WTs [46]. Corrosion, dirt and terminal 410 
damage are the main mechanical defects [44]. The group formed by generator, 411 
electrical system and control system, has a relevant rate of failures and 412 
downtime in WTs. Table 7 shows the main elements and failures in the 413 
generator, electrical and electronic components. 414 
Table 7. Principal faults in the generator, electrical and electronic components. 415 
Critical generator failure g031 Abnormal vibration G e048 
Power electronics and electric controls failure g032 Cracks e049 
Mechanical failure (generator) g033 Imbalance e050 
Electrical failure (generator) g034 Asymmetry e051 
Bearing generator failure g035 Air-Gap eccentricities e052 
Rotor and stator failure g036 Broken bars e053 
Bearing generator fault g037 Dynamic eccentricity e054 
Rotor and stator fault g038 Sensor Tª error e055 
Abnormal signals A g039 Temperature above limit e056 
Overheating generator g040 Short circuit (generator) e057 
Electrical fault (power electronics) g041 Open circuit (generator) e058 
Mechanical fault (power electronics) g042 Short circuit (electronics) e059 
 
Open circuit (electronics) e060 
Gate drive circuit e061 
Corrosion e062 
Dirt e063 
Terminals damage e064 
 416 
Figure 7 presents the FT for the main elements of the generator, electrical and 417 
electronic components given in Table 7.  418 
 419 
17 
 
g032
e059 e060 e061 e062 e063 e064
g031
g038
g040
e056e055
e054e053
e057
g037
e050 e051
e058
e052e049
g033 g034
g036
g042g041
g039
e048
g003
e048
g035
420 
 421 
Figure 7. Fault tree of the generator, electrical and electronic components 422 
 423 
4.4  Power train 424 
 425 
The power train, or drive train, is installed in the nacelle and consists of the 426 
main bearing, main (low speed) shaft, the gearbox and the generator. Through 427 
the main bearing, the rotor is attached to the low speed shaft that drives the 428 
rotational energy to the gearbox. The rotational speed of the rotor is generally 429 
between 5 and 30 RPM, and the generator speed is from 750 to 1500 RPM, 430 
depending on the type and size of generator. A gearbox is mounted between 431 
the rotor and the generator in order to increase the rotational speeds. The 432 
gearbox output is driven to the generator through the high speed train. A 433 
mechanical brake powered by a hydraulic system is usually mounted in the high 434 
speed train as a secondary safe breaking system. 435 
 436 
The low speed train failure includes main bearing [44] and low speed shaft 437 
defects. Severe vibrations can appear due to impending cracks in any 438 
component, or to the mass imbalance in the low speed shaft [46]. The gearbox 439 
failure is one of the most typical failures [41]. There are many studies about 440 
gearboxes in the literature because their failure causes significant downtimes in 441 
the system [3]. The most common faults were found in gear teeth and bearings 442 
due to lubrication faults [46], e.g. contamination due to defective sealing [42] or 443 
loss of oil [48], wear or fatigue damage which can generate pitting, cracking, 444 
18 
 
gear eccentricity, gear tooth deterioration, offset or other potential faults [41] 445 
and [33]. 446 
 447 
Overheating can appear in shafts due to the rotational movement of the high 448 
speed train. The wear and fatigue, that can initiate cracks [33] and mass 449 
imbalance [46], are the principal source of failures in the high speed shaft. The 450 
main failure causes of brakes are overpressure or oil leakages [29], cracking of 451 
the brake disc and callipers [51]. Figure 8 shows the FT for the main elements 452 
of the power train described in Table 8. 453 
 454 
  455 
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Table 8. Principal faults in the power train. 456 
Low speed train failure g043 Abnormal vibration D e065 
Critical gearbox g044 Cracks in main bearing e066 
High speed train failure g045 Spalling in main bearing e067 
Main bearing failure g046 Corrosion of pins in main bearing e068 
Low speed shaft failure g047 Abrasive wear in main bearing e069 
Main bearing fault g048 
Deformation of face & rolling element 
(main bearing) 
e070 
Wear in main bearing g049 Pitting (main bearing) e071 
Low speed shaft fault g050 Imbalance of low speed shaft e072 
Wear in low speed shaft g051 Cracks in low speed shaft e073 
Gearbox failure g052 Spalling (low speed shaft) e074 
Bearings (gearbox) g053 Abrasive wear in low speed shaft e075 
Lubrication of the gearbox g054 Pitting (low speed shaft) e076 
Gear failure g055 Abnormal vibration F e077 
Wear bearing gearbox g056 Corrosion of pins (bearing gearbox) e078 
Gear fault g057 Abrasive wear (bearing gearbox) e079 
Tooth wear (gears) g058 Pitting (bearing gearbox) e080 
Offset of teeth gears g059 
Deformation of face & rolling element 
(gearbox bearing) 
e081 
High speed shaft fault g060 Oil filtration (gearbox) e082 
Critical brake failure g061 Particle contamination (gearbox) e083 
High speed structural damage g062 Overheating gearbox e084 
Wear of high speed shaft g063 Abnormal vibration E e085 
Brake failure g064 Eccentricity (gear) e086 
Abnormal signals B g065 Pitting (gear) e087 
Hydraulic brake system fault g066 Cracks in gears e088 
Abnormal signals C g067 Gear tooth deterioration e089 
Overheating brake g068 Poor design of teeth gears e090 
 
Tooth surface defects e091 
Abnormal vibration J e092 
Cracks in high speed shaft e093 
Imbalance (high speed shaft) e094 
Overheating (high speed shaft) e095 
Spalling (high speed shaft) e096 
Abrasive wear (high speed shaft) e097 
Pitting (high speed shaft) e098 
Cracks in brake disk e099 
Motor brake fault e100 
Oil leakage (hydraulic brake) e101 
Over pressure (hydraulic brake) e102 
Abnormal speed  e103 
Tª sensor error (brake) e104 
Tª above limit e105 
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Figure 8. Fault tree for the power train.459 
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5 Results 460 
 461 
The most important events according to IM values obtained with the methods 462 
Birnbaum, Criticality, Structural and Fussell-Vesely can be identified in Figure 9. 463 
In this case, the most important events are e001, e003, e017, e018, e019, 464 
e036, e057, e058, e059, e062, e065, e084, e092 and e093, i.e. the events "yaw 465 
motor failure" and "abnormal vibration H" must be studied with detail because 466 
they probably cause a tower or foundation failure; the events "abnormal 467 
vibration A", "hydraulic motor failure", "leakages in hydraulic system" and 468 
"abnormal vibration C" are usually involved in a critical rotor failure; the events 469 
"short circuit (generator)", "open circuit (generator)", "short circuit (electronics)" 470 
and "corrosion" are prone to be the cause of an electrical failure; the occurrence 471 
of "abnormal vibration D", "overheating gearbox", "abnormal vibration J" and 472 
"cracks in high speed shaft" are the most probably causes of a power train 473 
failure.  474 
 475 
 476 
Figure 9. Importance measures for the WT. 477 
 478 
Importance measures are limited to a specific point of time as Figure 9 479 
indicates. For this reason, a novel dynamic simulation has been done in order to 480 
extend the analysis to a certain period of time. The literature does not include 481 
the values of the failure probabilities of the basic events and the WT operators 482 
are reluctant to publish it. Moreover, the nature and conditions of the events 483 
considered in the dynamic FTA could be very different. Consequently, several 484 
probability models are used for this purpose. The following time-dependent 485 
probability models are considered in this paper to describe the behaviour of 486 
events throughout time. 487 
I. Constant probability 488 
In this model the probability of the Event remains constant at all times. 489 
      , where K is a constant value from 0 to 1. 490 
II. Exponential increasing probability 491 
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In this model, probability function assigned is: 492 
           , where   is a parameter that takes only positive values 493 
and determines the rising velocity of the probability. 494 
III. Linear increasing probability 495 
In this model, probability function is: 496 
       , where m determines the rising velocity of the probability. 497 
IV. Periodic probability  498 
In this model, the events have a periodic behaviour following the next 499 
expression: 500 
                , n=1, 2, 3… 501 
where:  502 
   is a parameter that is positive and determines the rising 503 
velocity of the probability. 504 
   is a parameter that determines the period size. 505 
 506 
The Appendix I shows the fault probability functions assumed for each event. 507 
The experiences of wind turbine operators involved in the NIMO [11] and 508 
OPTIMUS FP7 European projects [12] have been considered in order to set the 509 
parameters of the time-dependent probability functions. The main purpose of 510 
this study is to show an example as close to reality as possible. This model 511 
could be adjusted to the specific wind turbine analysed, or to specific 512 
components. 513 
 514 
Figure 10 shows the failure probability assigned to each event throughout time. 515 
This probability has been obtained for 600 samples where each sample 516 
represents one day. The events of the FT have different behaviours according 517 
to their nature and the values of their parameters.  518 
 519 
 520 
Figure 10. Probabilities of occurrence of the events over the time.  521 
 522 
Figure 11 presents the probability of failure of the wind turbine (Qsys(t)) over 523 
the time. It is not continuously rising because there are events involved in 524 
preventive maintenance tasks, defined in Appendix I as periodic functions. 525 
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 535 
 536 
 537 
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 539 
 540 
Figure 11. Probability of WT failure (Qsys(t)) 541 
 542 
 543 
 544 
 545 
Figure 12 shows the IMs employing the methods Birnbaum (B), described in 546 
Section 3 and applied to the FT above depicted. The events e084, e036, e065 547 
have the highest IM according to the Birnbaum criterion over the time, these 548 
events should be studied in detail because the method provide a large IM value. 549 
There is a set of events with a significant IM over the time, such as events 550 
e077, e085, e093, e092 and e003. The rest of the events present lower 551 
Birnbaum IMs, i.e. they are usually less involved in the occurrence of the top. 552 
 553 
 554 
Figure12. Birnbaum importance over the time. 555 
 556 
The analysis leads to dynamic decisions from a quantitative point of view, 557 
enabling WT diagnostic and prognostic tasks to be carried out efficiently. 558 
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Therefore, scheduled maintenance strategies can be implemented more 559 
effectively. The behaviour of the system over time allows operators to obtain 560 
optimal maintenance decisions since identified components can be repaired or 561 
replaced based on their effect on the global system.  562 
 563 
For example, let the maximum allowable probability of system failure be 0.5. 564 
(Figure 11 shows that this value is reached at the 300th sample). It is ensured 565 
that the unavailability of the system is normal until the mentioned sample, and it 566 
is required the maintenance tasks before reaching that value. Once the system 567 
is in the critical iteration in which the maximum allowable unavailability is 568 
reached, it is necessary to act upon the components in order to reduce the 569 
failure system probability. Figure 12 provides useful information about how to 570 
focus the efforts to reduce such probability. Figure 13 corresponds to a cross 571 
section of Figure 12 and it shows the Birnbaum I.M. of the events at the 300th 572 
sample. 573 
 574 
 575 
Figure13. Birnbaum importance in a certain time. 576 
 577 
According to Figure 13, the most relevant information is the ranking of events 578 
that can be gathered from the Birnbaum I.M. The first three events that should 579 
be taken into account to plan a maintenance strategy are the events e084, 580 
e065, e036, i.e. corresponding to overheating gearbox, and abnormal 581 
vibrations.  582 
 583 
6  Conclusions 584 
 585 
The condition of the WTs is analysed in this paper using an FT-based 586 
approach. The qualitatively FTA requires a high computational cost. In this work 587 
the BDD is used for the quantitatively FTA and reducing the computational cost. 588 
The cut sets (combination of basic events whose simultaneous occurrence 589 
causes the top event to happen) generated by BDD will depend on the events 590 
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ordering. The “Level”, “Top-Down-Left-Right”, “AND”, “Depth-First Search” and 591 
“Breadth-First Search” methods have been considered for listing the events, 592 
and a comparative analysis of them has been done. The Level and AND 593 
methods create the listing of the events that provide a reduced number of cut 594 
sets. The Level, Depth-First Search and Top-down-Left-Right methods should 595 
be studied for each FT. Finally, the Breadth-First Search is the ordering method 596 
that provides a higher number of C-Ss. Importance measures for the FT have 597 
been also considered. They are used to identify the critical events that are more 598 
important for optimizing the condition monitoring system. A set of experiments 599 
are carried out for testing the importance measures, finding that all the 600 
approaches used give similar solution. 601 
 602 
An illustrative FT example for a WT has been developed. It is very important to 603 
mark that the FTs for the main components of the WT could be simplified or 604 
extended, but the authors, following the opinion of the experts and the research 605 
works considered, have set them in order to show the most relevant events. 606 
The importance measures were calculated and studied by a novel FT dynamic 607 
analysis that allows using the information for performing diagnostics and 608 
prognostics tasks and planning maintenance strategies. 609 
 610 
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Appendix I. Probability distributions for the events 618 
FT 1  Foundation and Tower Failure Probabilistic model 
assignment intermediate event code final event code 
Yaw system failure g005 Yaw motor fault e001 Constant 
Structural failure g006 Abnormal vibration I e002 Linear increasing 
Yaw motor failure g007 Abnormal vibration H e003 Linear increasing 
Wrong yaw angle g008 Cracks in concrete base e004 Constant 
Severe structural failure (foundation and tower) g009 Welding damage e005 Constant 
No electric power for yaw motor g010 Corrosion e006 Linear increasing 
Meteorological  unit failure g011 Loosen studs in joining foundation and first section e007 Linear increasing 
Structural fault (foundation and tower) g012 Loosen bolts in joining different sections e008 Linear increasing 
  
Gaps in the foundation section e009 Exponential increasing 
  
Vane damage e010 Exponential increasing 
  
Anemometer damage e011 Exponential increasing 
  
High wind speed / turbulence e012 Periodic 
  
No power supply from generator e013 Constant 
  
No power supply from grid e014 Constant 
FT 2  Critical Rotor Failure Probabilistic model 
assignment intermediate event code final event code 
Severe blade failure g013 High wind speed / turbulence e015 Periodic 
Blade failure g014 Blade angle asymmetry e016 Exponential increasing 
Pitch system failure g015 Abnormal vibration A e017 Exponential increasing 
Structural failure of blades g016 Hydraulic motor failure e018 Exponential increasing 
Hydraulic system failure g017 Leakages in hydraulic system e019 Constant 
Wrong blade angle g018 Over pressure in hydraulic system e020 Constant 
Hydraulic system fault g019 Corrosion in hydraulic system e021 Exponential increasing 
Meteorological unit failure g020 Vane damage e022 Constant 
Structural fault of blades g021 Anemometer damage e023 Constant 
Leading and trailing edges damage g022 Abnormal vibration B e024 Constant 
Shell damage g023 Root Cracks in the structure of blades e025 Constant 
Tip damage g024 Cracks in edges of blades e026 Constant 
Rotor system failure g025 Erosion in edges of blades e027 Exponential increasing 
Rotor system fault g026 Delamination in leading edges of blades e028 Exponential increasing 
Rotor bearings fault g027 Delamination in trailing edges of blades e029 Exponential increasing 
Rotor hub fault g028 Debonding in edges of blades e030 Exponential increasing 
Wear in bearings of the rotor g029 Delamination in shell e031 Exponential increasing 
Imbalance of blade system g030 Crack with structural damage in shell e032 Constant 
  
Crack on the beam-shell joint e033 Constant 
  
Open tip e034 Constant 
  
Lightning strike on tip e035 Periodic 
  
Abnormal vibration C e036 Constant 
  
Cracks in bearings of rotor e037 Constant 
  
Corrosion of pins in bearings of rotor e038 Exponential increasing 
  
Abrasive wear in bearings of rotor e039 Exponential increasing 
  
Pitting in bearings of rotor e040 Linear increasing 
  
Deformation of face & rolling element in bearings of rotor e041 Linear increasing 
  
Lubrication fault in bearings of rotor e042 Linear increasing 
  
Clearance loosening at root (hub) e043 Exponential increasing 
  
Cracks in the hub e044 Constant 
  
Surface roughness in the hub e045 Constant 
  
Mass imbalance in the hub e046 Exponential increasing 
  
Fault in pitch adjustment e047 Exponential increasing 
FT 3  Electrical Components Failure Probabilistic model 
assignment intermediate event code final event code 
Critical generator failure g031 Abnormal vibration G e048 Exponential increasing 
Power electronics and electric controls failure g032 Cracks e049 Constant 
Mechanical failure (generator) g033 Imbalance e050 Exponential increasing 
Electrical failure (generator) g034 Asymmetry e051 Exponential increasing 
Bearing generator failure g035 Air-Gap eccentricities e052 Linear increasing 
Rotor and stator failure g036 Broken bars e053 Linear increasing 
Bearing generator fault g037 Dynamic eccentricity e054 Linear increasing 
Rotor and stator fault g038 Sensor T error e055 Constant 
Abnormal signals A g039 Temperature above limit e056 Periodic 
Overheating generator g040 Short circuit (generator) e057 Constant 
Electrical fault (power electronics) g041 Open circuit (generator) e058 Constant 
Mechanical fault (power electronics) g042 Short circuit (electronics) e059 Constant 
  
Open circuit (electronics) e060 Constant 
  
Gate drive circuit e061 Linear increasing 
  
Corrosion e062 Periodic 
  
Dirt e063 Periodic 
  
Terminals damage e064 Linear increasing 
FT 4  Power train Failure Probabilistic model 
assignment intermediate event code final event code 
Low speed train failure g043 Abnormal vibration D e065 Constant 
Critical gearbox  g044 Cracks in main bearing e066 Constant 
High speed train failure g045 Spalling in main bearing e067 Linear increasing 
Main bearing failure g046 Corrosion of pins in main bearing e068 Linear increasing 
Low speed shaft failure g047 Abrasive wear in main bearing e069 Constant 
Main bearing fault g048 Deformation of face & rolling element (main bearing) e070 Linear increasing 
Wear in main bearing g049 Pitting (main bearing) e071 Exponential increasing 
Low speed shaft fault g050 Imbalance of low speed shaft e072 Constant 
Wear in low speed shaft g051 Cracks in low speed shaft  e073 Linear increasing 
Gearbox failure g052 Spalling (low speed shaft) e074 Constant 
Bearings (gearbox) g053 Abrasive wear in low speed shaft e075 Constant 
Lubrication of the gearbox g054 Pitting (low speed shaft) e076 Constant 
Gear failure g055 Abnormal vibration F e077 Linear increasing 
Wear bearing gearbox g056 Corrosion of pins (bearing gearbox) e078 Exponential increasing 
Gear fault g057 Abrasive Wear (bearing gearbox) e079 Linear increasing 
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Tooth wear (gears) g058 Pitting (bearing gearbox) e080 Constant 
Offset of teeth gears g059 Deformation of face & rolling element (bearing gearbox) e081 Linear increasing 
High speed shaft fault g060 Oil filtration (gearbox) e082 Constant 
Critical brake failure g061 Particle contamination (gearbox) e083 Exponential increasing 
High speed structural damage g062 Overheating gearbox e084 Linear increasing 
Wear of high speed shaft g063 Abnormal vibration E e085 Periodic 
Brake failure g064 Eccentricity (gear) e086 Constant 
Abnormal signals B g065 Pitting (gear) e087 Linear increasing 
Hydraulic brake system fault g066 Cracks in gears e088 Exponential increasing 
Abnormal signals C g067 Gear tooth deterioration e089 Exponential increasing 
Overheating brake g068 Poor design of teeth gears e090 Periodic 
  
Tooth surface defects e091 Constant 
  
Abnormal vibration J e092 Constant 
  
Cracks in high speed shaft e093 Linear increasing 
  
Imbalance (high speed shaft) e094 Periodic 
  
Overheating (high speed shaft) e095 Exponential increasing 
  
Spalling (high speed shaft) e096 Constant 
  
Abrasive wear (high speed shaft) e097 Linear increasing 
  
Pitting (high speed shaft) e098 Constant 
  
Cracks in brake disk e099 Exponential increasing 
  
Motor brake fault e100 Constant 
  
Oil leakage (hydraulic brake) e101 Linear increasing 
  
Over pressure (hydraulic brake) e102 Constant 
  
Abnormal speed e103 Linear increasing 
  
T sensor error (brake) e104 Periodic 
  
T above limit e105 Periodic 
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